| Role | Attack helicopter |
|---|---|
| Manufacturer | Mil |
| First flight | 1969 |
| Introduced | 1972 |
| Status | Active |
| Primary users | Russian Air Force ca. 50 other users (see operators) |
| Number built | 2000 (estimated) |
| Developed from | Mil Mi-8 |
| Variants | Mil Mi-28 |
The Mil Mi-24 (Cyrillic Миль Ми-24, NATO reporting name "Hind") is a large helicopter gunship and low-capacity troop transport produced by Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant and operated from 1972 by the Soviet Air Force, its successors, and over thirty other nations.
In NATO circles the export versions, Mi-25 and Mi-35, are simply denoted with a letter suffix as "Hind D" and "Hind E" respectively. Soviet pilots called the aircraft летающий танк (letayushchiy tank, “flying tank”). More common unofficial nicknames were Крокодил (Krokodil, “Crocodile”), due to the helicopter's new camouflage scheme and Стакан (Stakan, “Glass”), because of the flat glass plates which surrounded the three place cockpit of the Hind A version.
Development
During the early 1960s, it became apparent to Soviet designer Mikhail Leont'yevich Mil that the trend towards ever-increasing battlefield mobility would result in the creation of flying infantry fighting vehicles, which could be used to perform both fire support and infantry transport missions. The first expression of this concept was a mock-up unveiled in 1966 in the experimental shop of the Ministry of Aircraft's factory number 329 where Mil was head designer. The mock-up designated V-24 was based on another project, the V-22 utility helicopter, which itself never flew. The V-24 was similar in layout and configuration to the UH-1A Huey, with a central infantry compartment that could hold eight troops sitting back to back, and a set of small wings positioned to the top rear of the passenger cabin, capable of holding up to six missiles or rockets, with a twin-barreled GSh-23L cannon fixed to the landing skid.
Mil proposed the design to the heads of the Soviet armed forces, and while he had the support of a number of strategists in the armed forces, he was opposed by several more senior members of the armed forces who believed that conventional weapons were a better use of resources. Despite the opposition, Mil managed to persuade the defence minister's first deputy, Marshal Andrey A. Grechko, to convene an expert panel to look into the matter. While the panel's opinions were mixed, supporters of the project eventually held sway, and a request for design proposals for a battlefield support helicopter was issued.
Mil engineers prepared two basic designs: a 7-ton single-engine design and a 10.5-ton twin-engine design, both based on the 1,700 hp Izotov TV3-177A turboshaft. Later, three complete mock-ups were produced, along with five cockpit mock-ups to allow the pilot and weapon station operator positions to be fine-tuned.
The Kamov bureau suggested an army version of their Ka-25 Hormone ASW helicopter as a low-cost option. This was considered but later dropped in favor of the new Mil twin-engine design. A number of changes were made at the insistence of the military, including the replacement of the 23 mm cannon with a rapid-fire heavy machine gun mounted in a chin turret, and the use of the then-under development 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral) anti-tank missile.
A directive was issued on 6 May 1968 to proceed with development of the twin-engine design. Work proceeded under Mil until his death in 1970. Detailed design work began in August 1968 under the codename Yellow 24. A full scale mock-up of the design was reviewed and approved in February 1969. Flight tests with a prototype began on 15 September 1969 with a tethered hover, and four days later the first free flight was conducted. A second prototype was built, followed by a test batch of ten helicopters.
Design
The core of the aircraft was derived from the Mil Mi-8 (NATO reporting name "Hip"), two top-mounted turboshaft engines driving a mid-mounted 17.3 m five-blade main rotor and a three-blade tail rotor. The engine configuration gave the aircraft its distinctive double air intake. Original versions have an angular greenhouse-style cockpit; Model D and later have a characteristic tandem cockpit with a "double bubble" canopy. Other airframe components came from the Mi-14 "Haze". Two mid-mounted stub wings provide weapon hardpoints, each offering three stations, in addition to providing lift. The load-out mix is mission dependent; Hinds can be tasked with close air support, anti-tank operations, or aerial combat. The body is heavily armored and the titanium rotor blades can resist impacts from .50 caliber (12.7 mm) rounds. The cockpit is overpressurized to protect the crew in NBC conditions.
Considerable attention was given to making the Mi-24 fast. The airframe was streamlined, and fitted with retractable tricycle undercarriage landing gear to reduce drag. The wings provide considerable lift at high speed, up to a quarter of total lift. The main rotor was tilted 2.5° to the right from the fuselage to counteract dissymmetry of lift at high speed and provide a more stable firing platform. The landing gear was also tilted to the left so the rotor would still be level when the aircraft was on the ground, making the rest of the airframe tilt to the left. The tail was also asymmetrical to give a side force at speed, thus unloading the tail rotor.
As a combination gunship and troop transport, the Mi-24 has no direct NATO counterpart. While some have compared the UH-1 ("Huey") as NATO's direct counterpart to the Mi-24, this is inaccurate. While UH-1s were used in Vietnam to ferry troops, and were used as gunships, they were not able to do both at the same time. Converting a UH-1 into a gunship meant stripping the entire passenger area to accommodate extra fuel and ammunition, making it useless for troop transport. The Mi-24 was designed to do both, and this was greatly exploited by airborne units of the Soviet Army during the 1980-1989 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The closest Western equivalent was the Sikorsky S-67 Blackhawk, which utilized many of the same design principles and was also built as a high-speed, high-agility attack helicopter with limited troop transport capability; it, like the Hind, was also designed using many components from an already existing product, the Sikorsky S-61, itself a close approximation to the Mi-8/Mi-14. The S-67, however, was never adopted for service.
Ogaden War (1977-1978)
The first use of the Mi-24 in combat was with the Ethiopian forces during the Ogaden War against the Somalis. The helicopters formed part of a massive airlift of military equipment from the Soviet Union, after the Soviets switched sides towards the end of 1977. The helicopters were instrumental in the combined air and ground assault that expelled Somali forces from Ethiopia by the beginning of 1978.
The Mi-24A was extensively used by the Vietnam People's Air Force in the Cambodian-Vietnamese War. The gunships destroyed many Khmer Rouge bases and outposts up until 1986, when KR forces were driven to the border of Thailand.
Chadian-Libyan conflict (1978-1987)
The Libyan air force actively used Mi-24As and Mi-25s during their numerous interventions in Chad's civil war.[2] The Hinds were first used in October 1980 in the battle of N'Djamena where they helped the People's Armed Forces seize the capital.
In March 1987 the Armed Forces of the North, which were backed by the USA and France, managed to seize a Libyan airforce base at Ouadi-Doum in Northern Chad. Among the aircraft captured during this raid were three Mi-25s. These were turned over to France, which in turn sent one to the United Kingdom and one to the USA.
Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989)
The aircraft was operated extensively during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, mainly for bombing Mujahideen fighters. The US supplied heat-seeking Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen, and the Soviet Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters proved to be favorite targets of the rebels.
First deployment
Hinds were supplied to the Afghan government in April 1979 to deal with Mujahideen guerrillas. The Afghan pilots were well-trained and made effective use of their machines, but the Mujahideen were not soft targets. The first Hind to be lost in action was shot down by guerrillas on 30 May 1979.
The situation in Afghanistan grew worse and on 25 December 1979 Soviet troops were committed to the war, an action that would prove a major blunder. The Red Army found itself involved in a guerrilla war in a country where the rugged terrain favored the locals, who were enthusiastic, competent, and thoroughly determined fighters. The Hind seemed like an excellent weapon to help deal with the Mujahideen. Soviet field commanders requested all the Hinds they could get.
Early combat experience
After a brutal learning curve in the face of Afghan rebels, Hind pilots learned to be dangerous and cruel themselves, and the rebels called the Hind "Shaitan-Arba" (Satan's Chariot)". In one case, a Hind pilot who was out of ammunition managed to rescue a company of infantry by maneuvering aggressively towards Mujahideen guerrillas and scaring them off. The Hind was popular with ground troops, since it could stay on the battlefield and provide fire as needed, while "fast mover" strike jets could only stay for a short time before heading back to base to refuel.
The Hind's favored munition was the 80mm (3.15 in) S-8 rocket, the 57mm (2.24 in) S-5 having proven too light to be effective. The 23 mm (0.98 in) gun pod was also popular. Extra rounds of rocket ammunition were often carried internally so that the crew could land and self-reload in the field. The Hind could carry ten 100-kilogram (220-pound) iron bombs for attacks on strongpoints, while harder targets could be dealt with a load of four 250-kilogram (550-pound) or two 500-kilogram (1,100-pound) iron bombs. Some Hind crews became expert "snipers" dropping or tossing bombs precisely on targets. Fuel-air explosive bombs were also used in a few instances, though crews initially underestimated the sheer blast force of such weapons and were caught by shock waves that rattled their teeth.
Combat experience quickly demonstrated the disadvantages of having Hinds carrying troops. Gunship crews found the soldiers a concern and a distraction while being shot at, and preferred to fly lightly loaded anyway, especially given their operations from high ground altitudes in Afghanistan. Hind troop compartment armor was often removed to reduce weight. Troops would be carried in Mi-8 helicopters while the Hinds provided fire support.
It did prove useful to carry a technician in the Hind's crew compartment, handling a light machine gun in a window port. This gave the Hind some ability to "watch its back" while leaving a target area. In some cases a light machine gun was fitted on both sides to allow the technician to move from one side to the other without having to take the machine gun with him. Trying to shift a machine gun from one side of a helicopter to another while it maneuvered under fire was not merely clumsy and inconvenient, it was an invitation to deadly accidents.
This weapon configuration still left the gunship blind to the direct rear, and Mil experimented with fitting a machine gun in the back of the fuselage, accessible to the gunner through a narrow crawlway. The experiment was highly unsuccessful, as the space was cramped, full of engine exhaust fumes and was otherwise unbearable. During a demonstration an overweight Soviet Air Force general got stuck in the crawlway. Operational Hinds were retrofitted with rear-view mirrors to help the pilot spot threats and take evasive action.
The Hinds not only protected helicopter troop assaults and supported ground actions; they also protected convoys, using rockets with flechette warheads to drive off Mujahideen ambushes, performed strikes on predesignated targets, and engaged in "hunter-killer" sweeps. The hunter-killer Hinds operated in pairs at minimum, more often groups of four or eight, to provide mutual fire support. The Mujahideen learned to move mostly at night to avoid the gunships, and in response the Soviets trained their Hind crews in night-fighting, dropping parachute flares to illuminate potential targets for attack. The Mujahideen quickly caught on and scattered as quickly as possible when Soviet target designation flares were lit nearby.
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